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DRAFT: 8/20/08 – FORTHCOMING __ HARVARD J. GENDER & LAW ___ (2009)
ACCIDENTAL INCEST: DRAWING THE LINE – OR THE CURTAIN? –
FOR REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Naomi Cahn*
This article calls for setting limits on the number of offspring born from
any one individual’s gametes, and for continuing to sanction incest, even when it
comes to adult, inter-sibling consensual behaviour. The article examines the
issues of inadvertent consanguinity raised by third-party gamete use through a
feminist lens on both incest and reproductive technology. The central questions
concern regulation of reproductive technology, such as whether legal restrictions
on the fertility market might diminish the possibilities of accidental incest, as well
as whether criminal and civil sanctions of intrafamilial sexual behavior should
apply to relationships created through reproductive technology; these, in turn,
require examinations of the fertility business itself as well as broader justifications
for incest prohibitions.

INTRODUCTION

Incest is an increasing concern in the brave new world of test tube families. In 1980,
Martin Curie-Cohen raised the possibility of “inadvertent inbreeding” from donor sperm.
Others have called this “accidental incest, where the offspring of donated sperm or ova
meet and are unknowingly attracted.”1 The fear is pervasive, but fundamental questions
remain: Is this really incest? Should the law treat it as incest?2 In other countries, the

* John Theodeore Fey Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, Senior
Fellow, Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute. Thanks to Susan Bandes, Glenn Cohen, June Carbone,
Wendy Kramer, Cynthia Lee, Nancy Levit, Joan Meier, Catherine Ross, and Bob Tuttle for donating
support. Thanks also to Daniella Genet and Stefani Johnson and the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender
for believing in this project.
1

Libby Purves, Whose Body is it Anyway?, Times Online, Jan. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/libby_purves/article3187337.ece; Steven Kotler, In
an Industry Veiled in Secrecy, a Powerful L.A. sperm peddler Shapes the Nation’s Rules on Disease,
Genetics – and Accidental Incest, LA Weekly (Sept. 27, 2007).
2
All states criminalize sexual relationships between genetically related parents and children as well as fullblooded siblings, and the civil system voids any marriages between these family members. States vary on
the civil and criminal sanctions for relationships based on affinity, such as marriage or adoption. See
generally Model Penal Code § 230.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
In the reproductive technology area, Guido Pennings has suggested that, in certain contexts, such as when
one sibling uses another sibling’s gametes, that incest is a problematic concept; the traditional definition of
incest involves a sexual relationship between family members, and the technology enables reproduction
without any type of interpersonal sexual relationship Guido Pennings, Incest, Gamete Donation by Siblings
and the Importance of the Genetic Link, 4 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 13, 14(2002), available at

Draft

1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263980

fears of accidental incest have resulted in precautionary legislation that place limits on
the number of offspring any given donor can produce. The Netherlands restricts the
number of children from any individual donor to 25; in England and Australia, no more
than 10 families can use the same donor, although the number of children per family is
unlimited. In the United States, there are no legal limits on the number of offspring, but
with more than 40,000 children born from donor eggs and sperm last year,3 concerns
about what is now called “inadvertent consanguinity” are quite real.
Outside of the reproductive technology context, incest is in the air – and on the
air. The ABC Sunday evening soap opera, Brothers and Sisters, has both symbolic and
actual overtones of incest. The highest courts in Germany and England have each upheld
their criminal incest prohibitions within the past year.4 Legal commentators are
suggesting that prohibitions on incest, at least when defined as private consensual sexual
behavior between adults, may go the same way as private consensual sexual behavior
between same-sex partners.5
This article examines the issues of inadvertent consanguinity raised by third-party
gamete use through a feminist lens on both incest and reproductive technology. The
central questions concern regulation of reproductive technology, such as whether legal
restrictions on the fertility market might diminish the possibilities of accidental incest, as
well as whether criminal and civil sanctions of intrafamilial sexual behavior should apply
to relationships created through reproductive technology; these, in turn, require
http://users.ugent.be/~gpenning/ OR
http://www.rbmonline.com/4DCGI/Article/Detail?38%091%09=%20340%09.
This article does not address the legal or ethical issues involved in this use of the reproductive technology.
3
See Naomi Cahn, Test Tube Families: Why the Fertility Market Needs Regulation (forthcoming 2009).
The Centers for Disease Control collects statistics on the number of children born from donor eggs and
embryos, but not from donor sperm. Estimates vary, with numbers ranging from 20,000-30,000, and
approximately 10,000 children born from donor eggs or embryos. Sperm banks constitute $75 million of
the more than $3 billion annually spent in the fertility market. Kotler, supra note __.
A note about language: throughout this area, language mis/represents actual practices. Some have
suggested, for example, that artificial insemination be labeled “alternative insemination.” And sperm and
egg donors are, in most cases, sperm and egg sellers, although some gamete providers are not paid for their
contributions. Nonetheless, the practice is controlled by the image of charitable gametic contributions, see
Rene Almeling, . Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the
Medical Market in Genetic Material., 72 Am. Soc. Rev. 319 (2007); “’Why do you want to be a donor?’:
Gender and the Production of Altruism in Egg and Sperm Donation.” 25 New Genetics and Soc. 143 (2006)
-- notwithstanding the size of the fertility market. Consider the mixed messages on charity and
commodification in the following news article, Stephanie Smith, Dim Economy Moves Women to Donate
Eggs for Profit (Aug. 6, 2008), avail. at http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/08/05/selling.eggs/index.html.
Donor-conceived offspring who share a gamete provider may consider themselves to be “half-siblings.”
4
Fiona Barton, Shock for the Married Couple Who Discover They Are Twins, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 12, 2008,
1st §, at 5; Incest Remains a Crime—Mum’s Your Aunt, SYDNEY MX, Mar. 14, 2008, at 10.
5
Lawrence v. Texas; see, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and
the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1543, 1609 (2005)(questioning the bases for the incest taboo). William Eskridge, Body
Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 1011, 1057
(2005)(“In large part because the social and normative stakes of adult incest among cousins or siblings by
affinity are so low, Lawrence and its (or my) jurisprudence of tolerance do not clearly require that even
these statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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examinations of the fertility business itself as well as broader justifications for incest
prohibitions. That is, if there is nothing wrong with adult siblings (or half-siblings)
engaging in sexual relationships, then one of the primary bases for offspring-based limits
on donors is moot.
Incest lies at the intersection of family law and criminal law – the crime depends
on the definition of family; it criminalizes what would otherwise be legal, consensual acts
because of the family relationship between the parties.6 It is defined as involving family
members, and it criminalizes behavior between individuals because they are family
members, regardless of whether the underlying behavior would itself be subject to
sanction.7 Incest also has civil implications: an incestuous marriage is void from the
outset, without any action by either spouse.8 As courts and legislatures expand the
definition of what should be included in the private and protected sphere of consensual
relationships, incest should continue to be excluded. Calls for relaxing the prohibition
on incest come from two directions, one constitutional and the other jurisprudential. First,
there is the claim that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas calls
into question incest bans because of the private nature of the behavior; second, there is
the claim that incest inherently serves to reinforce the traditional nuclear, heterosexual
family, and is thus a patriarchal, hierarchical construct.9 Few, however, question the
basic incest ban on relationships between genetically-related parents and children.
Moreover, as this article argues, from both a constitutional and jurisprudential standpoint,
incest is distinctly different from same-sex sexual behavior.

6

See generally Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib, and Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, __ B.U.L.
Rev. __ (forthcoming 2008). Many states have criminalized incestuous relationships based both on
consanguinity and affinity. But see Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 2004)(incest
indictment dismissed in case involving sexual relationship between 60 year-old stepfather and his 16 yearold stepdaughter because of lack of blood relationship)(of the three dissenters, only one also dissented in
Goodridge). In the adoption context, for example, many states bar siblings who are related by adoption
rather than blood, from marrying. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 2003 Duke LJ
1073. As discussed infra, genetic half-siblings often do seek connection with one another.
7
Literary critic Fran Bartkowski explains that “Kinship is the place where lines of affiliation,
consanguinity and affinity come together. And incest is that site where law intervenes in these
arrangements of intimacy. Frances Bartkowski, Kissing Cousins: A New Kinship Bestiary (forthcoming
2008)(manuscript at 10).
8
See Douglas Abrams et al., Contemporary Family Law (2006); Joan Meier, The "Right" to a
Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 Wash. U. L.Q.
85 (1992).
9
See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARD. WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 359 (2004); Note: Inbred
Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the ”Sexual Family”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465
(2006)(“incest law currently ignore or obscure issues of consent”); etc.. While some advocate decriminalizing incest between consenting adults, there is no debate over the need to criminalize parent-child
sexual relationships. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal
Justice System's Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131, 145-149
(2007)(suggesting that, where it is available, prosecutors may file criminal charges under the lesser
penalties applicable to incest than to child sexual abuse); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse:
Evaluating the Danger Posed by A Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim's Siblings, 51 Emory L.J. 241
(2002). In discussing father-daughter incest, Wilson notes that, when one child is molested, there is a high
risk of additional siblings being sexually abused. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Removing Violent Parents from
the Home: A Test Case for the Public Health Approach, 12 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y and L. 638, 665 (2005).
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Ultimately, the article calls for setting limits on the number of offspring born
from any one individual’s gametes, and for continuing to sanction incest, even when it
comes to adult, inter-sibling consensual behaviour. These sanctions on adult behaviour
need not necessarily be criminal, so long as they continue to express strong antipathy and
disapproval. I must confess that I feel uncomfortable in differing from many other
thoughtful commentators in this area who have challenged the existence of a criminal
incest ban.10 For example, Professors Collins, Leib, and Markel argue that consensual
sexual relationships between adults, which might otherwise be subject to incest laws,
should be decriminalized and, to the extent that there is abuse in these relationships, there
are non-family based criminal laws that would apply.11 They would, however, “agree
that when sexual misconduct occurs in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency, a
sentencing enhancement is warranted for the breach of trust created by that asymmetrical
dependency.” 12
While I agree with their concerns that incest laws can reinforce the traditional
nuclear family form13 and infringe on private relationships, I remain concerned about the
“breach of trust” between family members, even when the family members are adults.
This breach of trust occurs whether family is defined by function, affinity, or genetics.
Moreover, given that incest typically occurs between a younger woman and an older
man, generally of a different generation (but sometimes not), I remain concerned about
power asymmetries in these relationships based on the intersection of family and gender.
On the other hand, applying this rationale to half-sibling who share the same donor but
grew up in different families is far trickier; consequently, the article explores the
traditional bases of the incest ban before suggesting that, for multiple reasons, the incest
ban apply to such half-sibling relationships, even though these power imbalances
probably do not exist. The article also calls for restrictions on the number of offspring
produced by any individual gamete donor for multiple reasons, not just because this
serves as a limit on the number of potential cases of “accidental incest” but also because
of concerns about the health of the donors, about donors’ willingness to disclose their
identities to potentially 100 “offspring.”
As an initial matter, to show the culturally contested significance of reproductive
technology, Part I briefly explores feminist approaches to the topic. Developing a
feminist approach to use of the reproductive technologies requires recognizing their
promises and limits, promises of liberation ranging from freedom from the biological
clock to new perspectives on male bodies, and limits on women’s autonomy, ranging
from the mothering mandate to selling eggs. Moreover, feminism provides insight into
the debates over whether one man can “father” too many children. Part II turns to a
discussion of existing practices on recruiting and limiting donors in the reprotech world.
It then suggests reasons for enacting limits on donors, including the rationales that other
10

See, e.g., Collins, Leib, and Markel, supra note __; Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and
Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 758-765 (2002)(questioning marital incest prohibitions).
11
Collins, Leib, and Markel, supra note __ (draft at 67).
12
Id. at 66.
13
For example, incest laws would not protect a child with gay or lesbian parents, where the state does not
allow the second parent to establish a legal relationship with the child. Draft at 65.
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countries have used. For egg donors, the equation is much simpler than sperm donors;
there are health concerns for women who donate too often. Sperm, however, is a
constantly renewable resource, and there is little concern about the long-term health of
frequent donors. Instead, the issues implicate broader concerns of incest and anonymity,
from genetics to disease transmission to moral repugnance. An exploration of how the
gamete market is currently structured and managed provides the context for discussing
the difficulties of further regulation.
To many people, incest just seems wrong,14 and this fear of incest is fundamental
to many of the justifications for incest and then to numerical limits on gamete donors.
Part III explores the various possible sources for this fear of incest; rationales for
justifying the incest ban come from diverse sectors, including anthropology, genetics,
religion and evolutionary biology. As part of the survey of perspectives on incest, it also
discusses the conflicting approaches within feminism to incest. Next, Part IV analyzes the
existing legal literature on incest, ranging from Justice Scalia’s hand-wringing fears about
the limited longevity of incest bans to scholars’ arguments against the incest ban, which,
presumably unintentionally, provide support for Scalia’s concerns. Finally, Part V offers
preliminary suggestions rooted in feminist theory for a justification for regulating incest.
This article advocates limits on the numbers of children born with the use of any one
donor’s gametes. It may be possible to limit the number of children born with the use of
any one donor’s gametes without a full-scale examination of incest.
In the context of the new reproductive technologies, Jurgen Habermas has
suggested that there is a need to “moralize human nature” and assert “an ethical selfunderstanding of the species.”15 In responding to this challenge and examining the
morality of our current approaches to the new reproductive technologies, my intent is to
promote an ethical approach to developing new laws that respects human dignity. My
intent is also to examine the points of intersection of various feminist approaches to
issues within reproductive technology. Feminism appears repeatedly in considerations of
the utility of the technologies, providing an appreciation of what it means (for the
provider, the recipients, and the child) to use other-provided gametes. Feminism also
offers a framework for articulating a coherent, sensitive, and contextual approach to
regulation. Developing this framework includes both an examination of the differing
feminist approaches to use of the technology (see Part I) as well as an analysis of whether
incest provides a meaningful construct (see Part III).

I.

FEMINISM, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND THE MARKET

14

See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
Moral Judgment, 108 Psych. Rev. 814 (2001); David A. Pizarro and Paul Bloom: The Intelligence of the
Moral Intuitions: Comment on Haidt (2001), 110 Psych. Rev. 193 (2003); see also Paul H. Robinson,
Robert Kurzvan, and Owen Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1633, 1645
(2007).
15
Jurgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature 25 (2003). Although I disagree with his argument that
this then should result in “ensur[ing] the contingency or naturalness of procreation,” Ibid., 25-26, I agree on
the significance of “modernity having become reflective.” Ibid., 26. For me, this book is reflecting on what
modernity has wrought.
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The promise of the reproductive technologies – producing babies – now goes
beyond curing infertility and challenges our conception of natural families as families
that are static and unchanging.16 Creating a family, regardless of whether you are an
infertile husband/wife couple, a same-sex couple, or a single person, now often involves
(although does not require!) deliberate choice. Indeed, approximately two-thirds, or four
million, of all pregnancies in the United States are “wanted”17 (although only a very
small portion of these are to the millions of people defined as infertile). Of course, use of
the technologies is not equally available to all, regardless of sexual orientation, class, or
race. Moreover, the possibility of purchasing eggs, sperm, or embryos from another
person has engendered its own controversies.
The politics of reproductive technology are deeply intertwined with the politics of
reproductive rights.18 This is a message that conservatives understand profoundly, and
that accounts for many of the legal and policy debates swirling around the technologies,
debates ranging from abortion to fertility treatment for poor women. On the other hand,
many feminists have not connected the two movements, and, although the reproductive
rights issue has a long feminist genealogy, infertility does not. This section first provides
a feminist framework for understanding reproductive technology, before describing the
infertility business and its regulation. Feminist ambivalence to reproductive technology
[Fragment?]
A. Feminisms and Reproductive Technologies
Much of the feminist history of reproductive politics involves an examination of
attempts to control fertility and sexuality by women, such as through contraception or the
power to say no to sex, and by others, such as through eugenics. While this history has
typically included relatively little inquiry into the need to enhance fertility, nor an
examination of the laws surrounding conception support, there is a developing literature
as feminists explore the multiple legal and policy issues posed by the new reproductive
technologies. Reproductive technologies promise to rescue women from two different
sets of dilemmas: 1) coerced baby vessel v. voluntary motherhood; or 2) baby v. career.19
Yet, as some feminists have alleged, these promises may be an illusion; the technology
might simply reinforce the importance of motherhood in women’s lives and the difficulty
of women “having it all.”
16

See, e.g., Janet Dolgin, Defining the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age,
(New York: New York University Press, 1999), 246.
17
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/FactSheet-KeyData.pdf (2007).
18
For insightful commentary on reproductive rights, see, e.g., Roe Rage, Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 384 (2007); Reva
Siegel, SEX EQUALITY ARGUMENTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: THEIR CRITICAL BASIS
AND EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL EXPRESSION, 56 Emory L.J. 815 (2007).
19
E.g., Ready, supra note __; ; Goodwin, __ G.W. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009); June Carbone, ___ G.W.
L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2009). On the issue of childfree living, see, e.g., Elinor Burkett, The Baby Boon:
How Family-Friendly America Cheats the Childless (2000); Maybe Baby: 28 Writers Tell the Truth About
Skepticism, Infertility, Baby Lust, Childlessness, Ambivalence, and How they Made the Biggest Decisions
of their Lives (Lori Leibovich ed. 2006); Nicki Defago, Child-Free and Loving It (2005).
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1. The Mothering Mandate
In its starkest terms, the basic debate goes like this: for those who have access to
it, reproductive technology exploits women because it reinforces a pronatalist ideology;
for those who do not have access to it, reproductive technology provides evidence of
privilege, allowing wealthy white women to reproduce themselves; and the mere concept
of reproductive technology encourages women to live men’s lives.20 With donor eggs or
surrogacy, this involves the transfer of money from wealthier couples to poor women,
who do not freely choose their participation. It is a market transaction that resembles a
sale. Indeed, as one student note alleges, it is difficult to control the “rapaciousness of
U.S. baby consumers.”21 The money and energy spent chasing reproductive technology
could better be spent on reforming the child welfare system both here and abroad and
paying for basic access to reproductive services for all women.
The related critique, a “patriarchal reproduction” position, fears that women are
unable to choose the new technologies voluntarily and that instead, male doctors or male
partners have indoctrinated women to produce children. Because of the mothering
mandate, women do not really have a choice concerning whether or not to use the
technologies; moreover, they have little understanding of the technologies themselves.22
Women are taught to value their lives based on whether they have produced children,
and are culturally coerced onto a never-ending treadmill of infertility. Catharine
MacKinnon has made similar arguments with respect to the authenticity of women's
voices, emphasizing that women are unable to make valid choices under patriarchy.23 In
other words, infertile women are socialized into wanting biological children and,
therefore, the law should foreclose the possibility of choosing the new technologies so
that women are not victimized. Professor Michele Goodwin critiques the “seductive
appeal” of these technologies because they appear to allow women to defer childbearing
so that they can advance in their careers – yet the health and emotional risks of using
reproductive technology is minimized.24
While this "patriarchal reproduction" analysis presents a significant and
cautionary perspective, it nonetheless both denies women any agency and also reinforces
the restrictions on options by income and class. Within feminism, there are numerous
other approaches to the possibility of reproductive technology, and other feminists might
claim that this radical feminist approach25 denies the possibility of choice under existing
20

For an articulation of these conflicting positions, see Karey Harwood, The Infertility Treadmill:
Feminist Ethics, Personal Choice, and the Use of Reproductive Technologies (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2007).
21
Nicole Bartner Graff, Note: Intercountry Adoption and the Convention on the Rights of the Child:
Can the Free Market in Children be Controlled?,” 27 Syr. J.. Int'l L. & Com. 405, 430 (2000).
22
Gena Corea, The Mother Machine 166-69 (1985).
23
Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State 126-54 (1989)
24
Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory Choice of
Motherhood, 9 J. Gender Race & Just. 1, 4-5 (2005).
25
Just as there are a diversity of views among feminists generally, each of the different strands of
feminism has a multiplicity of views; some radical feminists have celebrated the ability to separate sex
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social conditions, this view treats women as passive victims, disempowered from making
their own legal choices concerning the reproductive technologies. Religious ethicist and
philosopher Karey Harwood, who is concerned about the “overconsumption” of the new
reproductive technologies and how ART encourages women to delay their childbearing,
has nonetheless suggested that “the charge of pronatalism is overly simplistic,”26 and that
the focus should shift to how our culture can support caregiving. She supports the
treatment of infertility through reproductive technology, but suggests that women
consider having children at a younger age, rather than waiting until it becomes more
difficult.
Instead, this narrative can be turned around to become more celebratory, focusing
on how reproductive technology allows alternative opportunities to create children, and
may serve to disrupt the vision of the traditional married heterosexual family. Indeed,
many believe that the technologies are threatening because of this potential to allow
alternative family forms that do not involve one mother and one father.27 Moreover, an
alternative, more celebratory perspective suggests that women may have helped to shape
the new technologies, or that women have, at least in some sense, chosen to undergo the
risks associated with them. It may even be, as Professor Martha Ertman argues, that
women and men change roles when it comes to consumption of donor sperm. 28 That is,
men are the mere sperm providers, women the discerning consumers who want men only
for their bodies.29 Indeed, while women’s experiences are mediated through a culture that
reinforces biological motherhood, they may still look to technology as means of
empowerment for choosing with whom and when to have children.
2. Having It All

from reproduction. For one vision of this, see Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (1970). Debora
Spar briefly considers the diverging early responses of feminists to IVF. Debora Spar, The Baby Business:
How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Commerce of Conception 26 (2006); see also Liza Mundy,
Everything Conceivable: How Assisted Reproduction is Changing Our World (2007).
26
Harwood, supra note __, at 102, 160.
27

Elizabeth Marquardt suggests: “Our culture needs a serious debate about the implications of
technologies used to form many of today's alternative families . . .Our culture also needs to face up to the
importance of mothers and fathers in children's lives.” Elizabeth Marquardt, “My Daddy’s Name is
Donor,” Chi. Trib. May 15, 2005, avail. at http://www.americanvalues.org/html/donor.html. As Kay
Hymowitz charged, “American fatherhood has yet another hostile force to contend with: artificial
insemination.” Kay S. Hymowitz, The Incredible Shrinking Father, Chi. Sun-Times, April 29, 2077,
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_chicsuntimes-the_incredible_shrinking.htm. Some
are opposed to creating life outside the womb. E.g., Nicole Klass, Making Babies, For a Price, available at
http://www.metroland.net/back_issues/vol29_no49/features.html (discussing opposition of Citizens
Concerned for Human Life).
28

Martha Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of
Commodification, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (2003).
29
Id. at 41.
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When the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)30 decided to
launch an infertility awareness campaign in 2001, emphasizing that a number of factors –
ranging from smoking to age – affect infertility, it was concerned that a discussion of age
might, on the one hand, be seen as encouraging adolescent pregnancy, and, on the other
hand, as castigating women. And, once the ASRM rolled out these “Protect your
Fertility” advertisements, the National Organization for Women viewed this as a “’scare
campaign.’”31 Advertisements, like those involving a baby bottle shaped like an
hourglass, were viewed as giving the impression that younger women must “hurry up and
have kids” or give up and never have them, claimed Kim Gandy, the head of the National
Organization for Women.32 Others saw the message as telling women that they should
not be too ambitious, and should return to their homemaking roles.33 Feminist health
advocate Barbara Seaman accused the major drug companies which are engaged in
selling hormones, of encouraging women “to feel guilty . . ., implying that infertility is on
the rise because feminism tricked women into focusing on careers.”34
As feminists have alleged, it is possible to turn women’s age-related fertility
decline into an admonition that women should have babies at a younger age, and to
undercut women’s advances towards equality.35 Indeed, the national average age of a
woman’s first birth has risen from 21.4 in 1970 to 25.2 in 2004.36 For college-educated
women, the average age of first birth is 30.1.37 “Within such a model, “responsible”
reproduction follows financial independence and emotional maturity,”38 leading women
to have children after they have established themselves in their careers – but at a time of
declining fertility. Assisted reproduction thus becomes a critical component of feminist
support for gender equity, with reminders of age-based limits as spoilers.
30

The ASRM has approximately 9,000 members, 7,000 of whom are physicians, and published a leading
obstetrics/gynecology scholarly journal, Fertility and Sterility. See American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, History and Purpose, http://www.asrm.org/history.html
31
Liza Mundy, Everything Conceivable: How Assisted Reproduction Is Changing Men, Women, and the
World (New York: Knopf, 2007), 43 (quoting Kim Gandy, then president of NOW); See Claudia Kalb,
“Should you Have Your Baby Now,” Newsweek, Aug. 13, 2001, 40.
32
Nancy Gibbs, “Making Time For A Baby; For years, women have been told they could wait until 40 or
later to have babies. But a new book argues that's way too late” Time Magazine, Apr. 15, 2002, Sec.
Society, p. 48.
33
Ibid., p. 48.
34
Barbara Seaman, Treating Infertility: Amid a Confusing Array of Resources, How to Decide Which you
can Trust, Women’s Rev. Books (2004), available at
http://www.wellesley.edu/WomensReview/archive/2004/10/highlt.html#seaman
35
As one woman warns, this might “merely make women feel even more anxious and guilty about being in
a situation not necessarily of their own making.” Jemima Lewis, Infertility, Sunday telegraph, June 8,
2008, at 20. For analysis of how becoming a mother affects women’s workplace equality, see, e.g., Joan
C. Williams and Nancy Segal, Beyond The Maternal Wall: Relief For Family Caregivers Who Are
Discriminated Against On The Job, 25 Harv. Women’s L.J. (2003); the journal’s forthcoming article on a
related issue??; Naomi Cahn and Michael Selmi, The Class Ceiling, 65_ Md. L. Rev. 435 (2006).

36

Elizabeth Gregory, Ready: Why Women are Embracing the New, Later Motherhood 3 (2007).
Id.
38
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Shunning information about the relationship of infertility and age ignores
biological facts and, ultimately, not only inhibits women’s understanding of their own
fertility but also ignores the necessity of providing the legal structures necessary to give
meaning to reproductive choice. Information about controlling fertility must range from
means for preventing conception to means for promoting conception. It is only with this
information that reproductive choice becomes a meaningful concept; choice cannot mean
only legal control over the means NOT to have a baby, but must include legal control
over the means to have a baby. This knowledge can enrich the work/family literature.
Using a younger woman’s eggs allows (for better or worse) a woman to extend her own
fertility; using donor sperm facilitates the formation of families outside of the
heterosexual, two-parent structure.
The dichotomy between women as victims of technology and women as agents in
needing and demanding the technology is false. Instead, while women make choices
constructed by and within a social ideology that values childbearing, they are still able to
exercise some control over their options within these social constraints. Arguing that
women are unable to make their own decisions about reproductive technology reflects an
outmoded view of women as dependent, passive creatures, without a corresponding
recognition of the context in which these choices are constructed. Instead of taking away
options for women, the focus should be on reforming the surrounding social ideology:
motherhood at any cost.
3. Connections
Feminism suggests that legal institutions should “protect and nurture the
connections that sustain and enlarge us.”39 While this, of course, leads to respect for
connections between family members, it also results in an acknowledgement of the
connections that many donor siblings and parents feel to one another – and to their
donors. Indeed, sperm banks increasingly allow their clients to choose either identified
or anonymous donors.
Donor-conceived offspring often rue their lack of connection with at least onehalf of their genetic heritages.40 Because they want knowledge about their biological
progenitors, and because of their emotional needs for this knowledge, donor offspring
and their parents have begun to advocate for disclosure of their donor’s identity.41
Indeed, many women have begun to use the internet “to expand their kinship circle, to

39

E.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 4 (1997). Professor West continues, arguing that the law has
not intervened in intimate relationships to protect against the dangers of connection; see generally, Linda
McClain, The Place for Familie (2006); Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, Wis. Women’s L.J. __
(200?).

40

See generally Annette Appell, The New Blended Families: Legal, Blood, and Fictive Kin Networks and
Open Adoption 14-16 (2008)(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
41
See Naomi Cahn, Madelyn Freundlich, and Donaldson Adoption Institute, Old Lessons for a New World:
Applying Adoption Research and Experience to ART (2008)(forthcoming).
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create a unique extended family.”42 Wendy Kramer and Ryan Kramer, her donorconceived son, started the Donor Sibling Registry (DSR) in 2000 so that they could
establish an internet meeting place for donor-created offspring and their geneticallyrelated relatives. In 2007, almost 90,000 people visited the site, and the DSR has
facilitated contact among more than 5000 genetically-related people.43 Consider
Gwenyth Jackaway, who found genetic half-siblings for her son, Dylan, because she
wanted him to be “part of a larger community,” and refers to the other children she found
as “’Dylan’s siblings.’”44 Or think about Mike Rubino, Donor 929 at California
Cryobank. Nine years after Donor 929 began providing sperm, Oprah Winfrey aired an
episode about donor-conceived families. Rubino logged on to the Donor Sibling Registry
web site, and ultimately discovered that Rachael McGhee had written a thank you
message to Donor 929. He contacted her, the two of them talked, and she, along with her
two children that resulted from his sperm, spent a week with him in California.45
Ironically, some parents who have found offspring from the same donor through the
Donor Sibling Registry have left the site because they have been overwhelmed by too
many possible connections.46
Biological connection is, of course, only one way to form a family, yet the genetic
ties between their children cause many women to feel to feel family-like connections
with each other.
*

*

*

*

As is clear, there is no one feminist approach to fertility nor, as discussed later in the
article, to incest. The basics, examining the impact of gender, race, sexual orientation,
and class of any particular approach or policy, are a given. Beyond that, however, how
to measure those impacts, how to assess those impacts, how to accommodate those
impacts, there is no agreement. Feminists are ambivalent over whether reproductive
technology is a blessing because it facilitates reproduction and the formation of
alternative families, or whether it is a curse because it facilitates “too much” biological
mothering47 and class and race distinctions concerning access. Similarly, as discussed in
the next section, the reproductive technology world itself has developed with little
consensus or regulation of these issues; fertility clinics may discriminate based on sexual
orientation, for example, there are no binding standards on how many embryos to
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Liza Mundy, Everything Conceivable: How Assisted Reproduction is Changing Men, Women, and
the World 169 (2007)
43
http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/; see Mundy, supra note -_, at 168; Claudia Kalb, A Sperm-Biz
Overhaul, Newsweek, June 2, 2008, p. 41
44
Emily Bazelon, The Children of Donor X, O Mag., p. 250, April 1, 2008.
45
Michael Leahy, Family Vacation, Wash. Post. June 19, 2005; Page W12.
46
See Cheryl Miller, Parenthood at Any Price, The New Atlantis (2007), avail. at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/parenthood-at-any-price. She also points out that it is difficult
for a sperm donor to “connect” with multiple offspring.
47
That is, it puts pressure on women to become mothers; and it discourages mothering non-biological
children by disfavoring adoption.
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transfer, there is no requirement that anyone keep track of the numbers of children born
from sperm donors.48

B. Unlimited Giving; The Donor World
For anyone seeking sperm, there are thousands of possibilities. In the U.S. alone,
there are dozens of sperm banks in a business that accounts for about $75 million per
year.49 Consumers can let their fingers do the walking online, all in the privacy of their
own home. Banks provide differing levels of screening, offer videos, ship frozen sperm
in special canisters, or specialize in particular donor characteristics. There is even a site
that will help with the shopping so that the consumer doesn’t have to search each website.
Although frozen egg banks are relatively new, there are countless means for finding egg
providers, ranging from special matching services that are part of larger fertility clinics to
stand-alone recruiting options. And the number of physicians offering assisted
reproductive services has increased exponentially. The main trade group, the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology, reports that it has 392 members practices within the
United States that offer reproductive technology services, accounting for more than 95%
of all fertility clinics.50
Yet there are few systems in place to monitor gamete providers. In one of the
only studies to look at quality of sperm from commercial providers, Douglas Carrell and
his co-authors found more than a quarter of the participating sperm banks could be
providing “suboptimal” sperm.51 Researchers at New York University found that egg
donors frequently understated their weight. They looked at charts for more than 300
patients, and then compared the weight that donors reported when they first came to the
clinic with the actual weights at their first physical exams, and concluded that “donors do
not give accurate measurements of their body weight.”52 Yet there are no requirements
that clinics verify the information submitted by donors; the only federal requirements
concern the safety testing of the gametic material.
Although reproductive technology is today a multibillion dollar business, the
amount of state and federal regulation over any of the participants is limited, as is the
amount of self-regulation. The lack of market oversight has repeatedly been traced to the
comparatively limited use of the technology until the 1980s, as well as the contested
nature of the technology’s relationship to parenthood and other social issues. The
48

Because fertility clinics must report success rates, however, they do report the use of donor eggs and
embryos.
49
Steven Kotler, The God of Sperm: In an industry veiled in secrecy, a powerful L.A. sperm peddler
shapes the nation's rules on disease, genetics - and accidental incest, LA Weekly, Sept. 26, 2007,
http://www.laweekly.com/news/news/the-god-of-sperm/17290/.
50
Eric Surrey, “What is SART?,” Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, available at
http://www.sart.org/WhatIsSART.html
51
Douglas T. Carrell, et al., “Prospective, Randomized, Blinded Evaluation of Donor Semen Quality
Provided by Seven Commercial Sperm Banks,” 78 Fert. & Sterility 16, 20 (July 2002).
52
M. Cho and F. Licciardi, “Egg Donors Significantly Under-Report their Weights,” 86 Fert. & Sterility
(Supp. 1) S138 (Sept. 2006).
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technologies and their uses have radically changed over the past several decades, with,
for example, commercial sperm banks supplanting doctor-chosen sperm and the
increasingly successful use of donor eggs. Many of the controversies in this area have
appeared, and have been temporarily resolved, outside of the law: in doctors’ offices, in
scientific advances, or in philosophical inquiries. It may well, as one legal scholar
suggested, have been appropriate “to allow non-legal institutions such as ‘science’ or
‘medicine’ to be the primary forum for policy debate and resolution,”53 particularly in
light of the secrecy surrounding individuals’ use of the technology and the legal
consequences of coming forward.
Until the mid-1980s, the market for sperm was quite small. As infertility
physician Barry Verkauf explained in 1966, the medical literature contemplated only
three uses for donor sperm: when the “husband” was infertile, when children had died
from Rh incompatibility, and when the husband had a heredity disease that should not be
passed on the children.54 In the rare cases where donor sperm was used, it was typically
provided by friends or family of the recipient, did not involve payment to the donor, and
did not involve frequent donors. Issues involving limits on the number of children
resulting from any individual donor were essentially moot; given the ever-changing
composition of medical school classes, there was an enormous pool and relatively few
solicitations.
1. Donating to History
The first recorded artificial insemination of a woman occurred in 1785 when Dr.
John Hunter impregnated the wife of a London linen merchant with her husband’s
sperm.55 Another hundred years passed before Dr. William Pancoast performed the first
artificial insemination using donor sperm, the sperm of someone besides the patient’s
own husband, in 1884.56 The woman never knew that she had been inseminated by a
stranger’s sperm. Even if the husband had consented, artificial insemination by a donor
was somewhat scandalous, because it might expose the woman to a charge of adultery.
In 1948, the influential physician and lawyer Alfred Koerner, who was the
Executive Secretary to the National Research Foundation for Fertility, Inc., wrote one of
the first articles in a law journal addressing donor insemination. He observed that it was
important for the recipient woman to trust her physician to choose the right donor as well
as not to disclose her use of donor sperm.57
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Larry Palmer, Book Reviews, 38 Jurimetrics J. 223, 234-35 (Winter 1998); see generally Gaia Bernstein,
The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 Wash. L.
Rev. 1035, 1039-1041 (2002).
54
Barry Stephen Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and Confusion – An Appraisal of
Current Medico-Legal Status, 3 Hous. L. Rev. 277, 282 (1966).
55
Wilfred J. Finegold, Artificial Insemination 6 (1964); “History 1500- 1900,” Center for Reproductive
Medicine available at http://www.repromed.org.uk/history/history_1500.htm
56
Andrew Chang, “Anonymous Sperm Donation in an Era of Technology, Bioethics, and Business,” 3
Yale. J. Pub. Health 3 (2006), available at http://www.yaleph.com/archive/vol3no3/article3.html
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By the late 1980s, more than 400 sperm banks were in operation.58 Yet banks still
sold their wares primarily to doctors; in 1987, 60 percent of sperm banks in a federal
survey would sell only to doctors, and none would sell only to recipients.59 Sperm
banking became increasingly patient-oriented throughout the 1980s. In a series of
articles for Slate magazine, journalist David Plotz credits the Repository for Germinal
Choice (also known as the “Nobel Sperm Bank”), created in the late 1970s’, with
transforming the sperm banking business by requiring rigorous testing and providing
increasing amounts of information to consumers.60 Other banks began offering the same
services, and the AIDS epidemic added more incentives for additional safety tests.61
While there are no reliable figures on who uses sperm banks, anecdotal evidence
suggests that their usage by heterosexual couples is declining, but that usage by single
women and lesbians is increasing. .
2. The Incredible Egg
Egg provision has a far shorter history. The first documented egg donation
occurred in 1983; by 2003, clinics used more than 14,000 eggs in fertility procedures.62
Egg donation began with identified donors, who were often related to the recipients.
Today, identified donors constitute a much smaller part of the donation pool and
recipients are more likely to use specifically recruited donors. Eggs are typically
available under two circumstances: first, women already undergoing an IVF cycle may
agree to provide their eggs to other women in exchange for a reduced IVF fee; and
second, women from outside of the clinic may be recruited specifically to provide eggs.63
Until recently, most donor eggs had to be “fresh.” Worldwide, there were only
about two hundred children who had been born through the use of frozen eggs in 2006,
and egg banks were just beginning to be established.64 Frozen eggs, however, provide
various opportunities for expanding the market in eggs, perhaps resulting in increasing
numbers of banks – and increasing the opportunities for a woman to donate multiple
times.
3. Clinically Speaking
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Karen M. Ginsberg, Note: FDA approved?: A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry in the
United States, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 823, 826 (1997)(although the number of sperm banks used is not
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59
“Artificial Insemination Practice in the United States,” OTA, p. 11.
60
See David Plotz, Collected “Seed” (2005), http://www.slate.com/id/2119808/.
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E.g., Mundy, Everything Conceivable, supra note __, at 112.
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According to UCLA sociologist Rene Almeling, both egg and sperm donation
programs are structured similarly, with comparable stages for donors and recipients.65
All programs must first recruit donors, and then screen them. The screening typically
includes collection of both medical and personal history data.66 Aside from the laws
governing the various contractual relationships, few of which apply directly to
reproductive technology, this is perhaps the only other stage where the law plays a direct
role in the reproductive industry, mandating certain safety tests (discussed in the next
section) of the donated gametic material.
Third, the agency helps the donor prepare a personal profile, and then advertises
the profile. Clinics vary considerably as to how much information is included in this
profile. While egg donors may be identified through a picture and a first name, sperm
donors are more typically identified by number until the recipient requests (or pays for)
additional information.67 This difference in the initial introduction to gametes may be
gendered68, or it may be due to the comparative number of sperm and egg donors or the
lengthier process for producing eggs than sperm.
Once the profile is publicly available, the next stage involves matching donors
and recipients – and collecting fees. Programs are now required by federal law to do
some minimal follow up with sperm donors, such as by making sure that they are tested
for HIV once they have stopped providing samples altogether.69
4. Inspecting Gametes
Over the past several decades, the federal government has taken a few tentative
steps towards the regulation of reproductive technology. Today, it oversees clinical
laboratory services, drugs and medical devices that are used in IVF treatments, has
established standards for the use of human tissue, and provides monitoring of fertility
clinic success rates.70 Federal regulations covering the safety of “human cell, tissue, or
cellular or tissue-based products,” which included donor gametes, were finalized in
2005.71 All gamete providers must be screened, and all of their “products” must be tested
by federal law.72
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In addition to implementing standards for testing donors, the federal regulations
require that donation facilities maintain sufficient staff to ensure that they can comply
with the federal regulations, and personnel must be competent based on measures of
education, experience, and training.73 Clinics must establish their own internal quality
control program to make sure that any corrective actions are documented, personnel
receive proper training and education, periodic audits are performed, and computer
software is validated for its appropriate use.74 Clinics must also set up procedures for all
steps involved in the screening, testing, and determination of eligibility.75
Other than through these procedures for safety, federal law does not regulate the
medical procedures involved in donation. Clinics are not required to meet additional
standards (other than, perhaps, with respect to “tissue”), by preventing discrimination
against certain potential recipients or donors, by mandating any ongoing obligation for
donors to report health information, by regulating the disclosure of information to any
subsequently-born children, or by limiting the numbers of embryos transferred per cycle,
or even the number of times that one person can provide sperm or eggs to another. As one
journalist accurately charged after a thorough report in 2007 on California Cryobank, the
largest sperm bank in the world, “the industry has operated almost completely
unmolested. Outside of a mostly inept series of somewhat bizarre FDA rulings, there is
no top-down governance in the field. It is, as it has always been, self-policing.”76 For its
part, the industry often resists further regulation, claiming that it restricts patient choice
by creating market constraints. On the other hand, as discussed in the next section, there
are industry, non-binding guidelines on these issues.
5. The State of Industry Regulation
Long before the federal standards became effective, the reproductive technology
industry had undertaken self-regulation. This process is still ongoing, and the industry
has established its own voluntary standards and processes of accreditation that co-exist
with the federal and state regulations. The industry has also developed a series of ethical
guidelines that, again, are not binding, but that contain advice and standards on a variety
of topics that go beyond basic ART medical practice.
The ASRM Practice Committee has developed recommendations on the number
of babies born with one donor’s gametes. These recommendations are explicitly based
on concerns about genetically related donor offspring having children together (rather
than, for example, risks of widespread transmission of genetic disease or health issues for
donors):77
.
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Institutions, clinics and sperm banks should maintain sufficient
records to allow a limit to be set for the number of pregnancies for which a
given donor is responsible. It is difficult to provide a precise number of
times that a given donor can be used because one must take into
consideration the population base from which the donor is selected and the
geographic area that may be served by a given donor. It has been
suggested that in a population of 800,000, limiting a single donor to no
more than 25 births would avoid any significant increase of inadvertent
consanguineous conception.78
These standards are highly influential, but there is no regulatory agency that
oversees individual donors nor that monitors gamete banks on a routine basis. Banks
and clinics are not required to verify the personal information or much of the medical
information that donors provide them, nor is there a mechanism for monitoring limits on
the number of times that one individual can provide gametic material to another. Nor
must banks monitor what happens to the gametic material once it leaves their offices, and
there is no tracking of donors’ nor their offspring’s genetic diseases or other problems.
The occasional “mix-ups” that make their way into court remind consumers and the
public of the lack of oversight79, but the existing legal framework for remedying and
preventing these “mix-ups” is entirely inadequate. Moreover, given the mobility of many
Americans (and overseas gamete purchasers), limits based on an area population of
800,000 may not be adequate. Donors, those who use their gametic material, and donorconceived offspring are beginning to understand the limits of current oversight and to
advocate for change.80 Laws must mandate better practices, rather than relying on
industry internal guidelines and voluntary compliance.
C. Are We Alone Out There? Practices in Other Countries
Many other countries have imposed limits on the numbers of offspring produced
by any individual donor. In its landmark report in 1984, England’s Warnock
Commission recommended that no more than 10 children be born from any individual
donor.81 The Commission explained its concern about “the remote possibility of
unwitting incest between children of the same donor, and because of risks of transmission
of inherited disease,” but noted that “there was no conclusive argument for any particular
78
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figure.”82 Subsequently, the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did
not limit the number of children born with any particular donor’s gametes, but limited the
number of families who could use one donor’s gametes to ten (each family could have
more than 10 children, of course).83 Austria allows donors to provide gametes to only
one clinic, with a limit of three couples.84 Other countries have focused on the number of
children. For example, in Hong Kong, legislation was enacted in 2007 to limit the
number of children born from any single donor to three.85 Spain limits the number of
children born with any one donor’s gametes to 6.86
A second means of preventing “accidental incest” involves ensuring that offspring
know they are donor-conceived. In the United Kingdom, legislation has been introduced
requiring special notations on birth certificates for the donor conceived. And the state of
Victoria, in Australia, has launched a “Time to Tell” campaign, encouraging parents to
tell their children of their origins in an effort to ensure honesty as well as to prevent
potentially consanguineous unions.87
III. Why Ban Incest?
The traditional justifications for incest bans have centered on religion, genetics,
and anthropology; newer accounts have brought in insights from evolutionary biology to
support “kinship avoidance” behaviour. Freud, of course, opined that incest was natural,
that girls inevitably felt sexual desire for their fathers.88 Although the veracity of this
analysis has been repeatedly questioned, it is essentially irrelevant to any explanation or
reasons for the ban (although it does provide support for ensuring that it a ban exists).
My goal in this section is to provide a brief review of other explanations and
justifications for the prohibition.
1. Traditional and Modern Justifications
Traditional and more contemporary justifications for the incest ban include:
genetics, anthropology, evolutionary biology, and morality. The genetic justification
points to the increased probability of inherited diseases resulting from consanguineous
relationships.89 When it comes to gamete donation, there is also the possibility of
82
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dispersing one person’s diseases widely. The American laws on incest are derived from
British ecclesiastical laws on prohibited marriages, and by the beginning of the twentieth
century, as states developed their marriage laws, all states banned some types of
incestuous marriages.90 As mentioned earlier, incestuous relationship may subject both
parties to prosecution under criminal law and also result in marriages that are void. That
is, incest is a “double wrong” against the public, with both a criminal and a civil
component; unlike many other criminal acts, the civil wrong does not result in a private
remedy but in public non-recognition of the relationship.91
Genetics: In any given non-consanguineous relationship, the rate of severe
abnormalities in offspring is 2-3.5 percent.92 Between first cousins, the risk increases to
between 3-7 percent , while children of siblings or a parent-child coupling have a risk
between 32-44 percent93. While it is difficult to study the impact on humans over
numerous generations, studies of other animals show the genetic costs of inbreeding.
When sibling birds are paired over successive generations, the offspring line dies out
because “some damaging genes are more likely to be expressed in inbred animals. Some
potentially harmful genes are recessive and therefore harmless when they are paired with
a dissimilar gene, but they become damaging in their effects when combined with an
identical gene.”94
The higher rate of genetic abnormalities in consanguineous relationships provides
a partial justification for the incest prohibition. Yet it does not entirely explain the
strength of the prohibition, given that we do not require genetic testing “even when there
is a strong likelihood that each parent carries a recessive trait, as in the case of Tay-Sachs
disease in the Ashkenazi Jewish community.”95 Moreover, the incest ban arose prior to
our contemporary understanding of the relationship between genes and consanguinity.
On the other hand, early incest bans may have resulted from the anecdotal observations
of abnormal children who resulted from sexual relationships between closely-related
family members.96 The genetic justification does not, however, explain the ban on sexual
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relationships between affinity-related family members, such as adoptees or steprelatives.97
Given our knowledge about genetics, we might decide it is appropriate, based on
potential harm, to police certain relationships because of the statistically significant
increased risk of genetic abnormalities. The risk of harm to future offspring is palpable
and certain (although most such offspring will not experience these abnormalities)98.
Modern understandings of genetics provide a strong basis for making such an assessment,
regardless of whether this justification provided an historical explanation for the incest
ban. It may even be possible that, through the process of evolution (discussed below),
natural selection favored behaviours of kin avoidance; offspring of consanguineous
matings were less likely to survive. Ultimately, the genetics explanation separates into
two arguments: higher risk of birth defects, and an inherited tendency toward taboo.
To alleviate the concern over birth defects, in light of advances in genetic
understandings, it would be possible to allow incestuous relationships between relatives
who are incapable of procreating, or to require genetic testing in the case of pregnancy.
Although this might raise privacy concerns, it might be a constitutionally sustainable
compromise. Nonetheless, it would not address the other potential justifications for
maintaining an incest ban
Anthropology: A discussion of taboo brings us to the classic anthropological
formulation, which belongs to Claude Lévi-Strauss. He explained that the incest
prohibition forced families to marry outside of their closed, biological units by creating
bonds with other groups, thereby overcoming “the isolating influence of
consanguinity.”99 These bonds assured more harmonious group relations by assuring
kinship with potential enemies. A second, and equally familiar, explanation from the
anthropology literature, which addresses parent-child incest, focuses on the harmony of
intrafamilial relationships.100 Later anthropologists have suggested that the incest taboo
was not just a cultural artifact, but also biologically-based.101 The issue of whether the
taboo, as a natural phenomenon should give basis to criminal liability may be a tough
question. .
Evolutionary biology: Evolutionary biology may provide understanding of the origins
and maintenance of the incest ban, although it does not provide a justification per se.102
97

See Bratt, supra note __, at 352-53; Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note __.
The increasing use of screening tests before and during pregnancy
can help in reducing this risk.
99
Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Family, 278, in Man, Culture, and Society (Henry Shapiro ed. 1956); see
Claude Lévi-Strauss, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 479 (Rodney Needham ed.,
James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans.1949( 1969); Susan McKinnon, The Economies in
Kinship and the Paternity of Culture: Origin Stories in Kinship Theory, in Relative Values: Reconfiguring
Kinship Studies 277, 288-298 (Sarah Franklin and Susan McKinnon eds. 2001).
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See Jack Goody, A Comparative Approach to Incest and Adultery, 7 Brit. J. Soc. 286, 301 (1956).
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As June Carbone and I have argued, just because a particular behaviour has evolved in a certain way,
this does not mean that we as a legal society must legislate to reinforce that behaviour.
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Evolutionary biologists have found a kinship avoidance behaviour, but believe that it is
associated with familiarity rather than genetics.
In his 1894 book, Edward Westermarck suggested that sexual aversion develops
between family members who are raised together.103 Subsequent experiments have
confirmed and refined his initial hypothesis, suggesting a strong psychological
mechanism against sexual relationships with intimate family members that does not
necessarily depend on shared genes but on behaviours most likely to detect shared genes.
While it is difficult to perform a controlled experiment on the Westermarck hypothesis,
evidence from Israeli kibbutzim and Taiwanese marriages provide support for an
evolutionarily-based incest avoidance behaviour. In his study of 14,000 Taiwanese
women and their fertility, Arthur Wolf found that early cohabitation (beginning during
infancy or at a young age) with a later “mate” resulted in lower fertility and a higher
divorce rate than did marriages between mates who were not raised together.104 Although
the individuals were not genetically linked so this lack of sexual interest might be the
result of cultural messages, this appears unlikely; it would require both that culturallyimposed inhibitions against incest “are somehow transmitted from elders to offspring
with exceedingly high reliability; and second, such messages [must] affect the
development of sexual attraction with exceedingly high reliability.”105
In a test
involving 600 subjects, researchers found that childhood observations of a mother’s
interactions with another child and coresidence with a sibling provide a strong basis for a
“kinship estimator.”106
The subjects were asked about family composition and
coresidence, and then answered questions about their altruistic behaviour towards their
siblings (for example, how they had helped siblings in the past and whether they would
donate a kidney for a sibling) or their attitudes towards a series of sexual acts, including
some with family members. Older children observing their mothers’ interaction with a
younger sibling was the strongest cue for predicting kinship estimation. While Freud
believed that the incestuous impulse was natural and that cultural factors prevented its
full expression, contemporary evolutionary biologists and psychologist believe just the
opposite: incest avoidance is unnatural, and incest occurs because of a disruption in
normal relationships.107
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Edward Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage (1894). For one application of the hypothesis in
the legal literature, see David J. Herring, Foster Care Placement: Reducing the Risk of Sibling Incest, 37 .
Mich. J.L. Ref. 1145, 1147-1162 (2004)(discussing Westermarck’s thesis and two studies of Irene Bevc
and Irwin Silverman showing that opposite sex siblings who live together before the age of 3 develop a
strong aversion to incest).
104
Arthur Wolf, Sexual Attraction and Child Association: A Chinese Brief for Edward Westermarck
(1995).
105
Debra Lieberman and Donald Symons, Commentary, Sibling Incest Avoidance: From Westermarck to
Wolf, 73 Q. Rev. Bio. 463, 465 (1998).
106
Debra Lieberman, John Tooby, & Leda Cosmides, The Architecture of Human Kin Detection, 445
Nature 727,730 (2007); see also Debra Lieberman, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, Does Morality have a
Biological Basis? An Empirical Test of the Factors Governing Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest, 270
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. 819 (2003).
107
See, e.g., Mark Erickson, Rethinking Oedipus: An Evolutionary Perspective of Incest Avoidance, 150
Am. J. Psych. 411 (1993); Lieberman and Symonds, supra note __.
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Evolutionary behaviours can also help explain the parent-child taboo. Because
such behaviour distorts a child’s long-term mating strategies, researchers have suggested
that the incest taboo provides a generally effective prevention mechanism108 against
psychopathologies, which, in turn, reduce the affected individuals' chances
for normative marriage and parenting profiles. In addition, a similar
dynamic would hypothetically result from adult-male to boy incest. It is
suggested that to minimize the chances of adult-child sexual intercourse,
incest taboos have historically been reinforced and extended to
nonparental adults, especially men, beyond the immediate nuclear
family.109
Indeed, some have suggested that the process of human evolution has actually
“selected for genes that cause organisms to develop behavioral systems that lead
them away from mating with close genetic relatives,” particularly given the strong
association of incest with visceral reactions of disgust.110
Morality: Moral repugnance and disgust have served as traditional bases for the
incest ban (and, indeed, a full discussion of the significance of emotion to legal reasoning
is well beyond the scope of this article, although it is an issue that must be recognized111).
“Many states legislate against a lot of activities [such as] . . . incest . . just because those
activities are wrong.”112 Disgust is a cluster of approaches based in human emotional
reactions to various acts, involving extreme aversion typically based on a fear of
contamination.113 It is inherently connected with underlying cultural values, although
some behaviours appear to elicit disgust across cultures.114 Disgust can provide a useful
basis for judging the legality of certain acts; for example, disgust might help in
distinguishing various kinds of murders, with more disgusting ones more deserving of
harsher sanctions.115 It might be possible to develop appropriately structured disgust
responses within the law “so that we come to value what is genuinely high and to despise
what is genuinely low.”116
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See Ronald S. Immerman and Wade C. Mackey, An Additional Facet of the Incest Taboo: A
Protection of the Mating-Strategy template, 158 J. Genetic Psychol. 151 (1997).
109
Id.
110
See Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, supra note __, at 1645.
111
For some of the most useful commentary on this issue, see, e.g., The Passions of Law, supra note __;
Haidt, supra note __.
112
John Witte, Can America Still Ban Polygamy?, Christianity Today Magazine (May 2008), available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/article_print.html?id=55605.
113
See William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust 2 (1997). Miller provides a social history and
defense of disgust. For insightful discussion of the politics of disgust in conjunction with Lawrence and
traditional religious approaches to same-sex relationships, see William Eskridge, Body Politics: Lawrence
v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 1011 (2005).
114
Miller, supra note _, at 15. Miller hypothesizes that some elements of incest definitions, such as the
prohibition on parent-child relationships, are in fact universal. Id. at 260 (n. 39).
115
Dan Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1621 (1998); The Progressive
Appropriation of Disgust, in Bandes, supra note __, at 63.
116
Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation, supra note __, at 71.
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On the other hand, disgust is an emotion that has, as Lawrence shows, typically
been used as a way to ostracize and discriminate against acts that are culturally
unpopular.117 Those on the right are “most vulnerable” to these emotions, while people
on the “left tend to be afraid of them;”118 they establish a hierarchy of appropriate
behaviour that attempts to limit not just public, but also intimate, actions.119 While the
acts themselves may not be harmful, culturally conditioned responses result in strong
feelings of aversion that, without any other basis, are converted into law. The long
history of anti-miscegenation laws provides an example of how one group’s feelings of
disgust resulted in discriminatory legislation. For incest, disgust may be a comparably
unstable basis. As Martha Nussbaum claims, not all incestuous relationships inspire the
same amount of disgust; “if we want to find reasons to make [brother-sister or adult first
cousin] incest illegal, disgust will not help us, and arguments about health issues are
perhaps exactly what we need.”120 The emotion of disgust is, on this view, an unstable
basis for making legal decisions.
Within contemporary social psychology, there is a healthy debate on the nature
(literally) of how we develop moral reasoning. Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model
suggests that moral reasoning follows moral judgment; we develop reasons to support our
moral intuitions121 and, within certain limitations, we do follow our intuitions.122 Moral
judgments, then, result from innate intuitions although, Haidt explains, they are also
affected by social context and groupings.123 By contrast, others argue that rational
deliberation and reasoning are critical in the development of moral judgments.124
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See Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law 125, 171 (2004). The
Philospher Leon Kas has used repugnance as a means for limiting varopus new uses of reproductive
technology, including cloning. E.g., Leon R. Kass, Defending Human Dignity, in Human Ethics and
Human Dignity 297, 298 (President’s Council on Bioethics 2008), avail. at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/human_dignity/human_dignity_and_bioethics.pdf.
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Drew Westen, The Political Brain 380 (2007).
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Jonathan Haidt, The moral emotions, in Handbook of affective sciences 852 ( J. Davidson, K. R.
Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith, ed. 2003), avail. at http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/haidt.themoral-emotions.manuscript.html.
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Id. at 81.
121
Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note __, at 814, 830; see generally Milton C. Regan, Moral
Intuitions and Organizational Structure, 51 St. Louis L.J. 941, 955-962 (2007).
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Simone Schnall, Johnathan Haidt, Gerald L. Clore, and Alexander H. Jordan, 34 Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Bull 1096, 1106 (2008)(finding disgust particularly effective at affecting moral judgments).
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Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund, Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality, in Moral
Psychology, vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality 181 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed. 2007), avail. at
http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/haidt.bjorklund.social-intuitionists-answer-6-questions.doc (pp.
8-10 of this version); see also Richard E. Redding, It’s Really About Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay
Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust, 15 Duke J. Gender L. & Poly 127, 188-89 (2008)(discussing role
of disgust in response to gay sex).
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E.g., Pizarro and Bloom, supra note -_, at 195. The separation of law and moral ideals, of course, has a
long history in jurisprudence, in, for example, the nineteenth century work of John Austin.
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Ultimately, the initial reaction of disgust may serve as a useful guide, so long as it is then
challenged and subjected to more rigorous analysis, exploring its bases and engaging in
discussion.125
2. Is There a Feminist Approach to Incest?
Feminists have considered a variety of issues relating to incest. Most feminists
believe that father or mother/child incest is exploitative, at least when the child is a
minor.126 Indeed, these insights about power and family dynamics are confirmed by an
analysis of the 28 criminal incest cases decided by state courts over the past decade (list
attached). All [but 1-2] involved an older man, such as a stepfather, uncle, or father.
Studies of father-daughter incest have shown that daughters do not initiate the sexual
behaviour, and that daughters experience strongly negative emotions, such as disgust and
fear.127
Other aspects of the incest ban are more contested and result in challenges to the
traditional justifications as exploiting women. Theorist Judith Butler suggests that the
anthropological justification for the taboo, the concept that the taboo requires marriage
outside of one’s kin group, functions to subjugate women, who are unable to remain
within their own tribes, but must serve as reproductive vessels for other cultures.128
Similarly, anthropologist Susan McKinnon has observed that the incest taboo maintains
patriarchal control over women because it allows men to control women’s
reproduction.129
Numerous scholars argue for relaxing the incest ban on consensual sexual
relationships between adults. Such bans cannot, they observe, be maintained given the
Court’s recognition of a liberty right in consensual sexual relationships: “we think it is
straightforward that a respect for autonomy and limited government permits consenting
adults to engage in the sexual relations they deem appropriate . . . we largely agree with
[Justice Scalia that Lawrence] makes it difficult to resist the conclusion we draw.”130
125

See, e.g., Gregory E. Kaebnick, Emotions, Rationality, and the “Wisdom of Repugnance,” 38 Hastings
Ctr. Rep. 36, 44 (2008); Regan, supra note __, at 962-633 (“intuitions are not necessarily irreducible
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need not regard oral intuitions as beyond our understanding or influence”). The interrelated role of
emotions and reason, reminding us of, for example, David Hume, has also become popular in explanations
of voting behaviours. See, e.g., George Lakoff, The Politics of the Mind (2008); Drew Westen, The
Politics of the Brain (2007). Kass
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161, 167 (Arthur P. Wolf and William H. Durham eds. 2004).
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(forthcoming 2008) (draft at 48 and n. 169), available on SSRN.
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Although she does not advocate overturning incest laws, Professor Courtney Cahill urges
“that the law reappraise the extent to which disgust motivates” these laws.131 One student
note writer argues that Lawrence requires courts to favor “liberty over loathing,” and
thereby allow consensual incestuous relationships.132
By contrast, feminist theorists who concentrate on father/child incest are more
likely to highlight the dangers of incest. Focusing on the power imbalances inherent in
“an asymmetrical relationship of dependency” leads to prohibitions on certain
relationships, regardless of whether they are established through blood, marriage, or
caretaking.133 Although uncle/niece is not generally a direct dependency relationship,
inter-generational relationships involve comparable power dynamics, and should be
included in the prohibition.
A final feminist insight revisits behavioral biology, suggesting that men's and
women's different reproductive strategies raise the possibility that technology will
magnify the reproductive advantages of dominant men. The feminist arguments
identifying polygamy as a form of male dominance relate to these concerns. As
Professor June Carbone notes:
Behavioral biology, with support from anthropology, suggests that a hunter
gatherer society limited the possibilities of one man siring too many children.
Once technology made an increase in wealth possible, it expanded the
opportunities for differential reproduction . . . Many argue that monogamy then
became a critical aspect of democracy not to increase the status of women, but to
limit the reproductive advantages of powerful men for the benefit of other men.
This system, of course, also linked individual women's status to their relationship
to their husbands, and used legitimacy to privilege some offspring over others,
and tie the well being of a given woman's children to her relationship with their
father. Unlimited sperm donation threatens to set up a new status hierarchy, with
big reproductive payoffs for those men who would be picked from the fertility
clinic lineup. Some men would find that very attractive, while most of us are
horrified.134
Feminism provides multiple understandings and potential justifications for
limiting the number of offspring from any individual donor, including a profound
appreciation for the complexities of an incest ban. Because this article uses incest as a
primary – albeit not the only – justification for such limits, the next section turns to a
legal analysis of the incest ban
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Cahill, supra note __, at 1611.
Brenda J. Hammer, Note: Tainted Love: What the Seventh Circuit Got Wrong in Muth v. Frank, 56
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IV. WHY IS INCEST OVER THE LEGAL LINE?
Although incest is the stuff of popular culture, it appears much more rarely in the
legal world. A Lexis search for criminal incest cases in state courts over the past decade
yielded comparatively few criminal cases. Leigh Bienen’s landmark 1998 article,
Defining Incest, has been cited fewer than 15 times in the Lexis or Westlaw databases.135
Based on Lawrence, however, scholars have begun to reexamine the incest ban. Incest
also figures in the litany of cultural and legal disasters that critics claim might result from
recognizing a constitutional right to the “liberty” of sexual privacy. This part first
examines Supreme Court doctrine on the relationship of incest to other issues of sexual
privacy before turning to a discussion of the justifications for the incest ban.
A. Just What Is Private?
The Supreme Court has never opined directly on the constitutionality of the incest
ban, although the word “incest” does occasionally appear (usually regarding a list of
possible offenses other than the one of which the defendant was convicted), and the Court
has considered criminal procedure issues in connection with incest convictions.136 Incest
appears as a more direct concern in a limited number of the Court’s cases on the
parameters of reproductive privacy. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court
analyzed various challenges to a Pennsylvania statute setting limits on access to
abortion.137 The Court upheld limits applicable to minors seeking abortions, but struck
down various limits for adult women, relying on the Due Process Clause and its
protection of “liberty.” In his dissent, Justice Scalia defended the criminalization of
various private actions, including incest:
The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced Roe is displayed
in plain view by the fact that . . . the best the Court can do to explain how
it is that the word "liberty" must be thought to include the right to destroy
human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate
a value judgment and conceal a political choice. . . . But it is obvious to
anyone applying "reasoned judgment" that the same adjectives can be
applied to many forms of conduct that this Court . . . has held are not
entitled to constitutional protection -- because, like abortion, they are
forms of conduct that have long been criminalized in American society.
Those adjectives might be applied, for example, to homosexual sodomy,
polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of which are equally "intimate"
and "deeply personal" decisions involving "personal autonomy and bodily
integrity," and all of which can constitutionally be proscribed because it is
our unquestionable constitutional tradition that they are proscribable.138
135
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Plugging in the term “incest” for a search of Supreme Court cases on LEXIS resulted in 57 cases. In
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400 (1987), the Court considered a Double Jeopardy challenge in the context of
an incestuous act. In Kentucky v. Hamilton, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984), the Court
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And here he is in Lawrence, accusing the majority of undermining traditional
prohibitions on a wide variety of sex crimes:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity
are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based
on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by
today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its
decision to exclude them from its holding.139
The majority in Lawrence, however, did not mention incest at all, and did, in fact,
“cabin” its holding. It explicitly clarified the “scope of its decision,” observing that the
“case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or
coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”140
B. Is Disgust a Constitutional Justification?
If the dominant theme of abortion cases now concerns the jurisprudence of regret,141
disgust is the corresponding theme in the reproductive privacy cases. Indeed, Courtney
Cahill has written a fascinating article about the “slippery slope” that is so critical to
Justice Scalia’s accusations in Lawrence, suggesting the importance of challenging “the
extent to which incest-revulsion has substituted for national evaluation of the incest taboo
(and anything to which incest has been compared).”142 Like others, she calls attention to
the role of repugnance in creating taboos, and the need to question the validity of this
visceral, emotional reaction as a basis for law-making. Yet, as this article suggests, it

private, consensual sexual conduct, on the one hand, and adultery and incest . . .With respect to incest, a
court might well agree with respondent that the nature of familial relationships renders true consent to
incestuous activity sufficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition of such activity is warranted.” Id.
at 199, 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 590 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
140
Id. at 578. Indeed, mPage: 27

uch of the commentary on Lawrence mentions Kennedy’s efforts to acknowledge the
value of same-sex intimacy, thus arguably distinguishing homosexuality from polygamy,
and arguably incest.
141

See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J..,dissenting), Neil Siegel, Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex.
L. Rev. 959, 1025 (2008). Justice Ginsburg scathing observed that, “[u]ltimately, the Court admits that
"moral concerns" are at work . . . [and that] the notion that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act furthers any
legitimate governmental interest is, quite simply, irrational.” Id. at 1647, 1653. Thanks to Nancy Levit for
this analogy.
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Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A
Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1543,
1609 (2005).
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may be possible to distinguish incest from other consensual sexual relationships that have
elicited moral revulsion, using rationales other than disgust.143
The role of morality and consensus within constitutional law jurisprudence defies
any precise definition. In interpreting the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment, for example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to
“evolving standards of decency.”144 As in Lawrence and Roe, the Court counts states
with specific approaches to determine the parameters of “decency,” another term with
indefinite moral reach that depends on cultural concepts of appropriateness. While regret
and disgust are emotional responses, their underlying content is inseparable from
comparable cultural concepts that establish a baseline of socially acceptable conduct in
the same way as decency. Of course, as the Court pointed out in Kennedy (a case
involving rape by a stepfather), societal “[c]onsensus is not dispositive.”145 On the other
hand, the Court used much of its Kennedy opinion to discuss the penalties for child
rapists in various states, and the Court also attempted to distinguish the “’moral
depravity’” of child rape from the depravity involved in murder.146 The dissent
challenged the majority’s gradations of acts of moral depravity, observing that, to
“ordinary Americans, the very worst child rapists . . . are the epitome of moral
depravity.”147 The question, then, of what role morality, emotions, and evolving social
norms should play in constitutional jurisprudence remain unresolved.
C. Incest is Different
In light of the various criticisms of the incest ban, a justification for continuing
the ban in any context must satisfy three tests to be coherent: 1) it must be segregable
from incest’s possible uses as a legal and cultural reinforcement of the marital family; 2)
it must carefully craft an approach towards moral repugnance so that disgust is not
determinative of our ban on incestuous relationships; and 3) it must not call into question
the growing acceptance of same sex relationships.
In this context, consider the California Supreme Court’s invocation of incest in
its decision requiring the state to recognize same sex marriage. The court carefully
distinguished its rationale on the equality of same-sex relationships from the rationales
supporting other sexual matings, noting:
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For differing perspectives on emotion and the law, see generally The Passions of Law (Susan Bandes
ed. 1999).
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See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Kennedy v. Louisiana,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-343.pdfGeorgia (2008), Joanna H. D'Avella, NOTE:
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We emphasize that our conclusion that the constitutional right to
marry properly must be interpreted to apply to gay individuals and gay
couples does not mean that this constitutional right similarly must be
understood to extend to polygamous or incestuous relationships . . .
.because of their potentially detrimental effect on a sound family
environment.148
Constitutionally, then, there are several methods for upholding the incest ban.
First, if consensual sexual relationships are part of a protected fundamental right, then the
state may have a compelling interest in banning them.149 Compelling interests, as
discussed in the next section, may range from protecting children from abuse to
protecting the family.150 If the level of scrutiny is either intermediate or rational basis,
then the state’s compelling interest certainly justifies the ban.
Second, there is a more fundamental question (as it were) which relates to what
types of consensual sexual relationships are included within the right. If the right to
sexual privacy is defined to include only non-caretaking relationships, for example, then
the level of scrutiny is irrelevant, and certain incestuous relationships fall outside the
scope of the right. The right to sexual privacy could be defined to include relationships
between: 1) adults who were never part of a caretaking relationship, and thus would
exclude not just parent-child incest, but also stepparent-child incest, even in the absence
of a legally recognized bond between the parent and the child;151 2) adults who are
related through affinity or blood as second cousins or further (thus excluding uncle and
aunt/niece and nephew) relationships.
Third, even if some incest laws – such as those between comparatively distantly
related relatives152 – might be suspect under a privacy analysis, a nuanced application of
constitutional law can help in drawing the right lines both inside and outside of the
reproductive technology world. While Lawrence may call into question some forms of
consensual intrafamilial relationships, it still allows for carefully crafted laws banning
some forms of incest.153
148
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Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality,” Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming
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Establishing the standard for measuring the constitutionality of an incest ban or
the parameters of a right to sexual privacy depends on the question of what justifications
exist for the prohibition. The risk of birth defects may provide a rationale for the ban on
incest in itself, while gay and lesbian sex does not result in such palpable harms. This
rationale is strongest between immediate family members and becomes more attenuated
with cousins. Once the ban is recognized to require a compelling state interest, it doesn’t
necessarily follow that every aspect is subject to a compelling state interest scrutiny. The
dividing line among different forms of incest may be arbitrary.
IV. Setting Limits in the Gamete World
Aside from concerns about incest, there may be reasons special to the
reproductive technology world to limit gamete donations. This section explores the
multiple reasons for establishing limits, ranging from incest concerns to protecting donors
and donor-conceived families.
A. Protecting Donors and Donor-Conceived Families
All gamete donors face psychological issues involved in providing eggs or sperm
to another person in order to create a child.154 There are also similar to what? issues of
exploitation; a man who provides sperm or a woman who provides eggs is commodifying
body products.155 While each of these must be considered when it comes to limits on
donation, there are additional issues for each type of gamete provider. Awkward
paragraph.
For egg donors, limits are much easier to justify based on health risks, and the
feminist health community has mobilized to document the effects of fertility drugs on
women. Judy Norsigan, the executive director of Our Bodies, Ourselves, has written
about the “substantial risks to women’s health” from multiple egg extraction.156 There is

84 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Is there a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 Hastings L.J. 987, 994 (2002)(“none
of this means that there is a presumptive right to do whatever might be done to increase the likelihood of
having, or not having, a child”).
154
Although there is relatively little literature on this in the reprotechnology world, there is a significant
amount of comparable discussion in the adoption world. Anecdotal accounts in the reprotech world
abound, however. See, e.g., Making Babies, Sperm Donor Confession, ABC Nightline, Aug. 30, 2006 (one
sperm donor “realized that there might be some child some day that would want to find me and just to see
what I looked like or where they came from and I hadn't given any thought to whether or not they'd be able
to do that,” and decided to make his identity known to potential offspring.
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For further analysis of the commodification issues, see Ertman, supra note __; Martha Ertman and Joan
Williams, Rethinking Commodification (2005); Baby Markets (Michele Goodwin ed. forthcoming 2009).
156
Judy Norsigian, Risks to Women in Embryo Cloning, Boston Globe, Feb. 25, 2005; Egg Donation for
IVF and Stem Cell Research: Time to Weigh the Risks to Women’s Health (2005), avail. at
http://www.etopiamedia.net/empnn/pdfs/norsigian1.pdf; see Barbara Seaman, Is this Any Way to Have a
Baby?, O Mag., Feb. 2004, avail. at http://www.gilliansanson.com/articles/infertility.htm. Seaman was the
co-founder of the National Women’s Health Network.
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also a problem of disclosure: egg donors are often not provided with sufficient
information concerning potential risks.157
Aside from the emotional issues,158 egg donation poses both short and long-term
risks. The first set of risks result from the impact of the hormones. The most common
short-term complication for oocyte donors is ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome
(OHSS).
Indeed, the donation procedure itself is actually controlled oocyte
hyperstimulation, designed to produce the maximum number of mature eggs, and a mild
form of OHSS is considered almost inevitable.159 Severe OHSS is rare but can be fatal,
with symptoms that include kidney and liver dysfunction and respiratory distress. Some
studies have shown that severe OHSS may be less common in donors than in women
undergoing IVF, partially based on the fact that donors stop after the eggs have been
retrieved, while IVF patients continue with additional procedures and hormones in their
attempts to conceive.160 On the other hand, the risk increases based on the number of
donations.161 To minimize OHSS, researchers are studying new drug protocols and
possible genetic markers, although the risks remain.162
Finally, the long-term risks of the hormones involved in oocyte donation include
various gynecological cancers, such as breast, ovarian, and uterine. Several medical
studies have shown that women who repeatedly undergo treatment with fertility drugs, as
do repeat oocyte donors, have an increased risk for these cancers. However, the evidence
is based largely on infertile women undergoing IVF, and several causes of infertility are
acknowledged to cause cancer as well.163 Disentangling the data is difficult, but initial
analysis suggests that healthy donors do not necessarily share the same increased risk for
breast and ovarian cancer, although the extent to which fertility treatments do affect those
cancers for healthy donors is uncertain. On the other hand, the data on the risk of uterine
cancer for healthy donors is sparse but more concern.164 Moreover, researchers do not
know whether repeated donations can affect the donor’s future fertility, and they are still
uncertain about the psychological consequences.
A second set of risks, beyond simply taking hormones, concerns the oocyte
retrieval process itself. This is a surgical procedure that requires repeated punctures of
the vaginal wall and ovarian follicles. As with any other surgery, complications are
157
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possible, including vaginal bleeding and infection. While the procedure is generally
done on an outpatient basis, physicians usually use some form of sedation.165 Thus, the
risks inherent in anesthesia, such as stroke and respiratory failure, are also present.166
The short and long-term health risks involved in oocyte donation are numerous
and potentially serious, and most policy-makers believe that these risks require further
research. Nonetheless, the ASRM concluded that “there are no clearly documented longterm risks” for egg donors, although, “because of the possible health risks . . . it would
seem prudent to consider limiting the number of stimulated cycles for a given oocyte
donor to approximately six.” 167 Although numerous eggs can be retrieved in each cycle,
many of them will not be fertilized and develop into children. The recommendation thus
provides an inherent limit on the number of children who might be born from the gametes
of any individual oocyte donor. Indeed, many fertility clinics do limit donation cycles
per donor to six and some to as few as three; 168 these limits are entirely self-imposed,
and a donor with proven fecundity is valuable to these clinics. There are well-publicized
stories of women who have donated at double the recommended limit.169
For sperm donors, the primary issue – aside from commodification -- is not the
donor’s health or future fertility, but how many related children should result from one
sperm donor. Any form of donation, either egg or sperm, involves the potential for
“inadvertent consanguinity,” where a donor has provided gametes to different families
and the resulting children do not know of their shared genetic heritage.170 As one former
donor explained his unease at having produced sperm that might have resulted in
hundreds of offspring, “If you do the math again, there may be 100 young women out
there that are basically my son's age that are his half siblings. I have to tell him that's how
it is.”171
Many sperm banks impose a limit on the number of children who can be born
from one person’s donated sperm. While the ASRM recommends taking into account the
geographical area and population base for a particular donor, it suggests a limit of 25
births per donor.172 This limitation makes sense, and it should be incorporated into the
FDA’s rules for sperm donors. In an age of easy travel, donor secrecy, and limited
understanding of genetics, reducing the number of children that can be born from each
donor reduces the possibility of inadvertent consanguinity.
Limits also prevent the widespread dissemination of disease. For example five
donor-conceived offspring – products of the same donor -- in Michigan all share the same
extremely rare disease of congenital neutropenia.173 Donation allows an individual to
165

Repetitive Oocyte Donation, supra note __, at S216.
See Guidice, Santa, and Pool, supra note ___, at 34-6.
167
ASRM Guidelines, supra note __: S159.
168
See http://ovatherainbow.com/FAQs egg donors.htm.
169
See Julia Derek, Confessions of a Serial Egg Donor (2004).
170
ASRM Guidelines, supra note ___: S158.
171
Making Babies, Sperm Donor Confession, supra note __.
172
ASRM Guidelines, supra note ___: S42-43.
173
Judy Graham, When a disease is donated; Mom's quest to warn daughter's offspring goes to the heart of
a thorny debate on sperm, egg donors, Chi. Trib., March 27, 2008, at C1; see Emily Bazelon, The Children
166

Draft

32

have multiple offspring – simultaneously – before the potential of disease transmission is
realized. Setting limits cannot prevent against disease transmission, but can help in
minimizing the number of people affected.
A final issue concerns informed consent and, its corollary, counseling. For both
kinds of gamete donors and for embryo donors, the informed consent process should
include issues relating to the ultimate disclosure of their identities, as well as medical
risks. The informed consent process should begin early, to ensure that all involved
understand the implications of the treatment. This may be a deliberate choice in order to
maximize the potential donor pool, given the demand for eggs. The informed consent
process could include a counseling component as well.
Various professional organizations, including both the Family Law Section of the
American Bar Association and the ASRM have already developed guidelines for the
informed consent process.174 At the least, full disclosure should include a discussion of
the known and potential health risks from donation, and the donor’s choice of how to
dispose of any unfertilized eggs. Clinics can implement various measures to minimize
pressure that patients may feel by, for example, providing information early and allowing
patients to ask questions, assuring patients that the informed consent process is
confidential, and that decisions concerning the ultimate disposition of their gametic
material will not be disclosed to anyone involved in their treatment.175
As a pragmatic manner, children are increasingly being told that they are donorconceived, and prospective parents are increasingly choosing known donors.176 With
donor-conceived increasingly searching for their gamete providers, the providers
themselves may be reluctant to be found by so many offspring.177 On the other hand,
increasingly openness may result in more investigation of possible consanguinity by
donor-conceived offspring before they become sexually involved with a partner. In the
alternative, marriage licenses might be conditioned upon a genetic screening to ensure
that there is no genetic link between the intended spouses. While it may also be possible
to condition marriage licenses on a voluntary agreement not to produce children (or to
require, as is true in some states, that the parties both be over a certain age), this begs the
issue of whether such relationships should ever be permissible. 178
B. But is Change Possible?
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Unlike other countries, the United States has adopted a piecemeal approach to
regulating the technologies, with oversight shared between the federal and state
governments, the industry, and the market.179 There is a tradition of federalism and
industry self-regulation that characterizes the medical profession. On the other hand,
Congress has enacted legislation that applies to the entire industry, and the FDA has
adopted regulations that apply on a national level. Consequently, the federal procedures
already in place could be adapted to protect against multiple donations by any individual.
While the industry has already promulgated voluntary guidelines, they are not enforced,
and clinics and banks are free to decide how to approach these issues themselves. The
existing federal procedures thus provide an appropriate starting place.
Once a potential donor arrives at a clinic, the clinic must take certain steps to
determine the donor’s eligibility, including a review of the applicant’s medical records
for various communicable diseases, such as Chlamydia and HIV.180 If the donor passes
the medical records examination, then the clinic must test the actual specimen collected
for communicable diseases.181 All tests must be done using FDA-licensed or approved
screening tests.182 Further, anonymous sperm donors must be re-tested at least six
months after the date of donation, which means that the specimens are collected, tested,
quarantined for six months, and then tested again before use.183 Interestingly, the same
stipulation does not apply to donated oocytes, which are only required to be withheld
until donor eligibility is established, without the comparable necessity of re-testing.184
Only after both screening and testing (and quarantine, for anonymous donors), is a donoreligibility determination made.
The federal government and the ASRM each require detailed records on every donor.
Because donors will be given different identification numbers by each bank, there must
be an effective means to ensure that the same person does not attempt to evade limits on
the number of donations per provider by visiting different recruiters and giving different
names. One solution would be for fertility clinics and sperm banks to collect a genetic
sample that could be sent to a central repository for verification that the donor is not
circumventing limits, and for ensuring a consistent identification number for any
particular donor. If each donor-conceived offspring knew, with certainty, the specific
donor gamete number, then a new dating ritual – perhaps even before the first kiss –
might involve inquiring about the genetic origins of one’s beloved potential sexual
partner.
CONCLUSION
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Ultimately, I’m not sure what to do about disgust in the reproductive technology
area. Although one reaction to learning that one man has contributed sperm to create
more than 100 offspring is disgust (perhaps awe for some), this is not necessarily a
universal, or even a majority, response. Some may be troubled (perhaps not “disgusted”)
by the “unnaturalness” of so many offspring of one individual in our current culture of
monogamy.185 Fears of inadvertent consanguinity contribute to this feeling of concern.
These feelings -- of disgust or concern -- do not mandate an automatic ban on the
possibility of inadvertent consanguinity, but they are helpful in developing a response.186
Disgust should not serve as the basis for drawing a line for constitutional or regulatory
demarcation, but does provide an “inkling”187 of the need to consider legal standards.
Most of the traditional explanations for the incest prohibition do not apply in the
reprotech context when it comes to restrictions on gamete provision. The Westermarck
hypothesis and its contemporary modifications do not apply to gamete donors; the
children typically have not been raised together. While the parents may feel a bond at
having used the same gamete donor, this does not translate into the prolonged contact
associated with the evolution of kin avoidance. The anthropological explanation, which
requires marrying out of one’s kin group in order to forge alliances and create a larger
society, similarly does not apply because the half-genetically related offspring have been
raised in different kin groups – although it is important to recognize that recipients of
gametes from the same donor do feel connection and kinship based on biology What
remains are health concerns for donors, a fear of genetic abnormalities, feminist fears of
unequal reproductive advantage, and the emotion of disgust – or concern. These can help
us in thinking about what it is we are seeking to regulate, and why.
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